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PURCHASE UNDER SECTION 16(b)
Morales v. Mapco, Inc.1
In 1964 Mapco, Inc. issued warrants each of which was to be con-
verted automatically into one-half share of Mapco common stock on
April 1, 1972. Alternatively, one warrant plus $9.00 could be exchanged
for one full share of Mapco stock prior to the expiration date.2 The
warrants had an anti-dilution clause which protected the warrant holders
against the issuance of Mapco common stock at a consideration of less
than $18.00 per share.
Ross, the financial vice-president of Mapco, acquired 3,616 warrants
and held them for more than six months. Ross exercised his early con-
version right, receiving 900 shares of common stock for 900 warrants,3
and sold the stock through the New York Stock Exchange. All necessary
forms regarding the transactions were filed with the Securities Exchange
Commission. 4 A shareholder's derivative action was brought against
Ross under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934- to
1. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,704, at 90,451
(10th Cir. 1976).
2. Mapco was listed on the New York Stock Exchange; warrants were
bought and sold in the over-the-counter market. On February 28, the date of the
first transaction in question, Mapco common closed at $41.00, and on March 24
at $43.25. The stock reached a high of $52.25 on June 20, 1972.
3. Through his broker, Ross disposed of 200 warrants on February 28,
1972; 100 warrants on February 29, 1972; 200 warrants on March 6, 1972; and
400 warrants on March 9, 1972. Additionally, in March Ross sold 200 warrants
to a third person and by the payment of $9.00 per warrant, secured 2,516 shares
of Mapco common stock himself.
4. Ross filed a Form 4, "Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of
Securities," for the months of February and March, 1972. These forms listed the
security as: "Warrants: Exercised and Sold ,as Common," gave the transaction
date, and stated the "Amount Sold or otherwise disposed of" as a total of 1,100.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) provides in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or
officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized
by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale any purchase, of
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months... shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of
such benefical owner, director, or officer in entering into such
transaction .... Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competenit jurisdiction by the issuer, or
by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf
of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
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recover any profits made by Ross on the sale of shares. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant Ross, but the Tenth
Circuit reversed holding that a cause of action had been stated against
Ross under section 16(b).
Prior to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
common law provided few remedies 6 for the abuses7 arising from in-
sider trading. The majority of courts held that officers, directors, and
substantial shareholders owed no fiduciary duty to corporate sharehold-
ers. Even if a fiduciary duty did exist, insider liability whs difficult to
establish. The common law remedies proved totally inadequate to deter
abusive insider trading.
To alleviate these inadequacies, Congress passed section 16(b) of the
1934 Act to prevent "the unfair use of information" by an insider ob-
tained "by reason of his relationship to the issuer.", The section pro-
vides that an insider who realizes a profit on the sale and purchase, or
the purchase and sale, of the corporation's securities within a six month
period can be forced to surrender those profits through an action
brought by the corporation on its own behalf or by a shareholder in a
derivative suit.9 In this manner, Congress sought to curb the evils of
insider trading by restricting the profits realized by insiders in transac-
tions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably
great.
In applying section 16(b) the courts have fluctuated between two
tests for insider liability: an objective test, and a pragmatic, subjective
test. Under the objective approach, the only question is whether the
transaction and the individual involved come within the literal statutory
requirements of section 16(b).10 Liability attaches as soon as it is shown
6. Remedies were limited under three theories of. relief. Under the majority
view, officers and directors owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders, and insiders
were liable only if they perpetrated a fraud. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v.
Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Voellmeck v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6 P.2d 373
(1931). A minority of jurisdictions held the corporate insider to a strict fiduciary
duty of disclosure to shareholders in connection with the sale of shares. See, e.g.,
Steinfield v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 P. 879 (1914); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga.
362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). Several jurisdictions followed the "special facts" doctrine
which stated that officers and directors did not owe a fiduciary duty to share-
holders unless special facts made it inequitable for the insider to take advantage
of the shareholders. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See generally
Comment, Section 16(b): Insider Trading, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 872.
7. For a list of abuses reported to Congress, see H.R. REP. Nos. 1383, 1838,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. Nos. 792, 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
9. Id. See also Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582, 595 (1972).
10. See generally Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider
Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 45 (1968); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragma-
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that a statutory insider has purchased and sold the securities in question
for a profit within a six month period. Whether the insider actually used
inside information or whether the transaction possibly could lend itself
to the type of speculative abuse that the statute was designed to prevent
are irrelevant questions.
The majority of section 16(b) decisions between 1934 and 1964 re-
garded the objective approach as vital to the protection of the investing
public against insider abuses. In Smolowe v. Delendo Corp." the Second
Circuit rejected the contention that the statute's preamble required the
court to find actual use of inside information before liability attached.
Noting that virtually any transaction within the definitional limits of sec-
tion 16(b) will result in liability, the court stated that "[t]he statute is
broadly remedial .... We must suppose that the statute was intended to
.... establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the
selfish interest of a fiduciary officer ... and the faithful performance of
his duty." 12 Similarly, in Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte13 the Second
Circuit specifically adopted the objective approach and concluded that
once the statutory requirements of 16(b) are met, liability will attach
whether or not the transaction was of the type Congress specifically in-
tended to proscribe.
Dissatisfied with the harsh result often produced by the literal in-
terpretation of section 16(b), courts increasingly have adopted a pragma-
tic approach. This subjective analysis is a two-step process. As in the
objective approach, the court first will determine whether the transaction
and the individual involved come within a broad reading of the statute.
If so, the court will examine the particular circumstances to determine
whether that situation possibly could have given rise to an abuse of in-
side information. Liability will ensue if the possibility of abuse existed.14
The pragmatic approach in section 16(b) analysis did not actually
emerge until 1965 in Blau v. Max Factor & Co. 15 The Ninth Circuit looked
beyond the literal requirements of the statute to inquire whether the
transaction under scrutiny offered the insider the opportunity to use in-
side information in short-term speculation.16 In that case, insiders con-
verted common stock into "class A" stock which they subsequently sold
on the market. The court refused to hold that such an exchange was a
purchase within the meaning of section 16(b) because "the making of the
exchange ... [was] simply irrelevant to the use of insider information in
11. 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (directors
and officers who had purchased and sold corporate common stock within a six
month period were held liable for short-swing profits).
12. Id. at 239.
13. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
14. Lowenfels, supra note 10; Wentz, supra note 10.
15. 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
16. Id. at 308.
19781
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short-term speculation-the problem with which Section 16(b) is con-
cerned." 17
Since Max Factor, courts have been more willing to look at the facts
surrounding each transaction to determine whether it is the type which
might lend itself to the abuse of inside information.1 8 The Second Cir-
cuit has changed its approach since Park & Tilford and has begun ex-
amining each case on an ad hoc basis to determine whether the trans-
action comes within the purpose of the Act.19 In 1966 the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Petteys v. Butler 2 0 specifically refused to follow the objective rule
prescribed in Park & Tilford. Application of the pragmatic approach is a
growing trend, especially where "unorthodox transactions" are in-
volved.
21
Under both the objective and pragmatic approaches, it first must be
determined whether the transaction is within the general definitional
boundaries of section 16(b). 22 The transactions in Mapeo were clearly
within the statutory definition. The defendant Ross was an "officer"
23 of
Mapco who realized profits from what was arguably the "purchase and
sale" 2 4 of an equity security 25 within a six month period.26 It is irrele-
vant whether Ross actually used inside information while carrying out
his transactions 27 because by definition liability ensues "irrespective of
any intention .... -28
17. Id. at 309.
18. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006
(1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959).
19. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967).
20. 367 F.2d 528, 533 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
21. Unorthodox transactions involve dealings other than the normal cash-
for-stock exchange. Examples include dealings in options, warrants and rights,
merger situations, and stock conversions. See text accompanying notes 29, 34-50
infra.
22. See note 5 supra.
23. 'An "officer" is a "president, vice-president, ... and any other person who
performs for an issuer ... functions corresponding to those performed by the
foregoing officers." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1977). See also Colby v. Klune, 178 F.
2d 872,. 873 (2d Cir. 1949) (another definition of "officer").
24. See notes 29-37 and accompanying text infra.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970). Except for the limitations that the
equity security must be "non-exempt" and be registered pursuant to § 12 of the
1934 Act, the term equity security has been defined broadly to include stock,
similar securities whether or not issued by a corporation, securities convertible
into stock or similar securities, and warrants and rights.
26. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 90, 453-54.
27. Since the pragmatic approach is concerned with the possibility of abuse
rather than actual abuse, the intention of the insider also is irrelevant under the
pragmatic test.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
[Vol. 43
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/16
RECENT CASES
The problem in Mapco was whether the conversion of warrants into
Mapco stock was a "purchase" within section 16(b). Although traditional
cash-for-stock transactions clearly are encompassed by section 16(b), the
question of the inclusion or exclusion of certain "unorthodox" transac-
tions such as options, rights, and warrants has not been so clear.2 9
From the objective test viewpoint, there would be no doubt that a
"purchase and sale" of Mapco common stock took place. Courts gener-
ally have agreed that the exercise of warrants into common stock is a
"purchase" within the statute 30 based on a broad definition of "pur-
chase" which includes "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise ac-
quire." 3  For example, the court in Park & Tilford held that the exer-
cise of an option to convert preferred stock into common stock, followed
by a sale of the common stock within six months, was a "purchase and
sale" within the meaning 16(b).32 In Mapco Ross did not own stock by
holding the warrants. However, upon the payment of $9.00 the warrant
could be converted into one share of stock. This was a purchase within
the meaning of the statute. The transaction thus was within the literal
boundaries of section 16(b) as required by both the objective test and the
first step of the pragmatic analysis. The pragmatic test requires the
further finding that there was a "possibility of speculative abuse." 33 An
analysis of the facts will support the court's finding that Ross' transac-
tions were purchases subject to speculative abuse.
In determining whether a particular unorthodox transaction lends
itself to speculative abuse, courts have taken into consideration such fac-
tors as the voluntary nature of the conversion 3 4 the economic indicia of
the purchase,3 5 whether the transaction involves economic equivalents,36
and the insider's position in the company and his awareness of current
market trends.37
29. For a discussion on unorthodox transactions, see Wentz, supra note 10;
Comment, supra note 6, at 884.
30. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907
(1949); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
31. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970).
32. 160 F.2d at 987.
33. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595
(1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 n.4 (1972);
Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 521-23 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959).
34. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959).
35. Id.
36. Id.; Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967).
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An example of an unorthodox transaction in which courts have
utilized these factors to determine the possibility of speculative abuse is
the exchange of shares following a merger.3 Two factors appear cru-
cial in this situation: the insider's ability to control the merger and, if he
has no control of the merger, whether he has access to inside informa-
tion concerning the merger. 3 9 If an insider is able to control the
merger and dictate its terms, courts have found potential for speculative
abuse and the insider will be liable for any short-swing profits made. 40 If
the insider has no control over the merger, the court should look to the
question of access to information; 41 access may indicate the possibility of
abuse. Thus, in determining whether an exchange of shares upon
merger constitutes a sale, a court first looks to control and, if none is
found, then examines the question of access to inside information.
In Ferraiolo v. Newman, 4 2 carefully considered by the court in Mapco,
it was held that the conversion of preferred stock into common stock did
not lend itself to the practices which section 16(b) was enacted to pre-
vent. The court considered the preferred and common stocks as
economic equivalents because there was no material change in propor-
tional equity ownership after the transaction.43  The court pointed out
that no money had been paid for the conversion of preferred into com-
mon stock. The court further noted that the transaction was involuntary
for all practical purposes because it had been forced genuinely and in-
tentionally by a call for redemption. 4 4 These factors led the court to
conclude that the transaction was not subject to speculative abuse and
had none of the "economic indicia of a purchase." 45 As a result, liabil-
ity did not attach. It therefore appears that the conversion of one class
of stock for another may not be within the scope of activity that section
16(b) was designed to prevent.
3-8. Wentz, supra note 10, at 235.
39. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
40. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
41. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973) where the court held that there was no possibility of abuse in an unsuc-
cessful tender offeror's exchange of stock following a defensive merger. If the
insider had access to inside information concerning the merger when he made
the purchase to be matched with the exchange of shares (sale) upon merger,
then a possibility of abuse exists. Clearly the insider, knowing that merger would
take place and that the new shares would be worth more than the old, could
abuse his position by purchasing before the merger at lower prices in theexpecta-
tion that he would receive something more valuable upon merger. The insider's
access to inside information concerning the merger has clearly given him a
choice which can be turned to speculative abuse.
42. 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
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Mapco involved a different "unorthodox transaction" from those al-
ready mentioned. This transaction was the conversion of warrants into
common stock and the subsequent sale thereof. The district court, citing
Ferraiolo, held that the warrants were the economic equivalents of com-
mon stock and that therefore the conversion did not constitute a
"purchase" for the purposes of section 16(b). 46 The court's finding was
due in part to the fact that the warrants were automatically convertible 47
and contained an anti-dilution clause. 48
The Tenth Circuit 49 reversed, concluding that the warrants and the
Mapco common stock were not economic equivalents. Ferraiolo was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the preferred stockholder had an equity
ownership and his subsequent conversion of preferred into common
stock left his equitable interest basically unchanged. As a result, the pre-
ferred and common stocks were held to be economic equivalents. 50  A
warrant, on the other hand, does not represent a present equity interest
in a corporation; it represents nothing more than a right to acquire such
an interest at a future time. 51 Thus, the Mapco warrant-holder had no
equity ownership until the warrant was exercised or terminated. The
court held that because Ross had no equity ownership before the exer-
cise of the warrants and did have equity ownership after the exercise,
the transaction was a purchase within the scope of section 16(b).52
In holding that the transaction was outside the province of section
16(b), the district court noted that the simultaneous nature of the exer-
cise of the warrants and the sale of the common stock gave no opportun-
ity for abuse by Ross. 53 This argument is weak because Ross had been
an insider prior to the exercise of the warrants and conseouentlv w s in
a position to gain access to information which, when publicly released,
conceivably could cause a decline in the market price of the stock. 54 In
such a case, assuming that the exercise of the warrants was classified as a
purchase rather than as a conversion, the immediate sale of the common
stock could be predicated upon the type of speculative abuse at which
the statute is directed. Ross' position in the company and his awareness
46. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,094, at 97,875
(N.D. Okla. 1975).
47. Id. The court found that since the warrants were automatically converti-
ble upon expiration, there was an absence of voluntariness.
48. Id.
49. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REIp. (CCH) 95,704, at 90,451
(10th Cir. 1976).
50. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959).
51. Hazen, The New Pragmatism Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1, 9 (1975).
52. Morales v. Mapco, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,704, at 90,454 (10th Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 97,879.
54. Hazen, supra note 51, at 27.
1978]
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of the current market rendered him liable for any short-swing profits
because the resulting transactions included the possibility of speculative
abuse. There need not be actual speculative abuse for liability to attach;
the possibility of such abuse is sufficient.
Ross should be liable for the short-swing profits realized under
either the objective or pragmatic approach. Applying the objective ap-
proach, Ross was an insider and the "purchase and sales" took place
within the statutory period. Under the pragmatic approach, the exercise
of the warrants constituted a purchase within section 16(b) and the
transaction contained the possibility of speculative abuse of inside infor-
mation.
For unorthodox transactions such as that in Mapco, the pragmatic
test is the better approach to determine insider liability under section
16(b). To hold an insider liable under the literal objective approach
would hinder the use of business incentive plans such as stock options,
warrants, and convertible securities. The knowledge that the ability to
dispose of stock acquired through one of the above plans might be lim-
ited could make insiders reluctant to accept the arrangement. Although
the pragmatic approach does provide more protection for the insider by
requiring the possibility of abuse in the transaction, it too may hinder the
use of these "bonus" plans for officers and employees. Because a finding
of actual abuse is not required, "a perfectly innocent insider may have to
account to the corporation for any profits realized from an unorthodox
transaction. In the Mapco situation, the pragmatic approach might im-
pose liability even if he had let the warrants automatically convert into
Mapco common stock.55 This result may seem unfair if inside informa-
tion was not actually used, but such a finding is necessary in order to
protect the interests of outside investors. Corporate insiders owe primary
loyalty to the corporation and should not enter transactions which may
have a detrimental effect on shareholder interests.56 The pragmatic ap-
proach has the effect of protecting these interests. It may be argued that
the test should be whether actual abuse has occurred. Such abuse, how-
ever, is difficult to prove. Because insiders possess special knowledge
that outside shareholders lack, it would be an unfair advantage to let
them deal freely in the company's securities when such knowledge may
benefit them at the expense of other shareholders. The outside
shareholder interest should be the primary concern of the corporation
and therefore insider trading must be restricted in those situations
where the possibility of speculative abuse exists.
EDWARD A. CHOD
55. In such a case, even though Ross' special knowledge would not benefit
him in the conversion of the warrants, it possibly could benefit him when he
subsequently sold the stock.
56. The sale of a large number of shares by insiders could cause a drop in
the stock's market price thereby causing shareholder interests to decline.
[Vol. 43
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